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Abstract
We present a combinatorial algorithm for determining the market clearing prices of a general
linear Arrow-Debreu market, where every agent can own multiple goods. The existing combina-
torial algorithms for linear Arrow-Debreu markets consider the case where each agent can own
all of one good only. We present an O˜((n+m)7 log3(UW )) algorithm where n, m, U andW refer
to the number of agents, the number of goods, the maximal integral utility and the maximum
quantity of any good in the market respectively. The algorithm refines the iterative algorithm
of Duan, Garg and Mehlhorn using several new ideas. We also identify the hard instances for
existing combinatorial algorithms for linear Arrow-Debreu markets. In particular we find in-
stances where the ratio of the maximum to the minimum equilibrium price of a good is UΩ(n)
and the number of iterations required by the existing iterative combinatorial algorithms of Duan,
and Mehlhorn and Duan, Garg, and Mehlhorn are high. Our instances also separate the two
algorithms.
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1 Introduction
In a linear Arrow-Debreu market, there is a set B of n agents and a set G of m divisible
goods. We will refer to an individual agent by bi for i ∈ [n] and to an individual good by gj
for j ∈ [m]. Each agent comes with a basket of goods to the market, more precisely, agent
bi owns wij ≥ 0 units of good gj . The total supply of gj is then
∑
i wij units. Moreover,
the agents have utilities over the goods and uij ≥ 0 is the utility derived by agent bi from
one unit of good gj .
The goal is to find a positive price vector p ∈ Rm≥0 and a non-zero flow f ∈ Rn×m≥0 such
that:
a) For all j ∈ [m]: ∑i fij = ∑i wijpj (all goods are completely sold)
b) For all i ∈ [n]: ∑j wijpj = ∑j fij (agents spend all their income)
c) fij > 0 implies uij/pj = max`∈[m] ui`/p` (only bang-for-buck spending)
Such a price vector is called a vector of equilibrium prices. In a), the left hand side is the
total flow (of money) into gj and the right hand side is the total value of all units of good gj .
In b), the left hand side is the income of agent bi under prices p and the right hand side is
his spending. In c), max`∈[m] ui`/p` is the maximum ratio of utility to price (bang-for-buck)
that agent bi can achieve. Agents spend only money on goods that give them the maximum
bang-for-buck. For agent bi and good gj , we use xij = fij/pj for the amount of gj allocated
to agent bi. A price vector p and an flow f as above is called a market equilibrium.
We make the standard assumption that every agent likes at least one good, i.e., for all
i, maxj uij > 0, and that each good is liked by some agent, i.e., for all j, maxi uij > 0. We
also make the nonstandard assumption that for every proper subset B′ ⊂ B there is at least
one good gj that is not completely owned by the agents in B′ and such that at least some
bi ∈ B′ is interested in gj , i.e., wkj > 0 for some bk 6∈ B′ and uij > 0 for some bi ∈ B′. In
other words, there is no subset of agents that are only interested in the goods completely
owned by them. References [14, 6, 10] show how to remove the nonstandard assumption.
We assume that utilities uij and weights wij are integral and use U = maxi∈[n],j∈[m] uij
to denote the maximum utility and W = maxj∈[m] maxi∈[n] wij to denote the maximum
weight. Then the budget available to any agent is bounded by
∑
j wijpj ≤ nW maxj pj .
Linear Exchange markets were introduced by Walras [18] back in 1874. Walras also
argued that equilibrium prices exist. The first rigorous proof for the existence of equilibirum
under strong assumptions was given by Wald [17]. Arrow and Debreu [1] gave the proof
for the existence of equilibrium when the utility functions are concave. There has been
substantial algorithmic research put into determining the equilibrium prices since the 60s.
Codenotti et al. [2] gives a surveys the algorithmic literature before 2004. While there
are strongly polynomial approximation schemes for determining the equilibrium prices [15,
13, 8], the existence of a strongly polynomial exact algorithms still remains as an open
question. There have been exact finite algorithms [11, 12], exact weakly polynomial time
algorithms [14, 19, 10, 9] and the characterization of the equilibrium prices as a solution set
of a convex program [6, 16].
A market equilibrium can be found in time polynomial in n, m, logU and logW by a
number of different algorithms. Jain [14] and Ye [19] gave algorithms based on the ellipsoid
and the interior point method, respectively, and Duan and Mehlhorn [10] and Duan, Garg,
and Mehlhorn [9] described combinatorial algorithms. The algorithm by Ye has a running
time of O(max(n,m)8(logUW )2), see [9, footnote on page 2].
The combinatorial algorithms actually only solve a special case: m = n and each agent
is the sole owner of a good, i.e., wii = 1, and wij = 0 for i 6= j. The algorithm in [9] solves
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the special case in time O(n7 log3(nU)). A reduction for reducing the general case to the
special case is known, see Section 2. However, it turns a general problem with n agents
and m goods into a special problem with nm goods and hence leads to a running time of
O˜((nm)7poly(log(U))) (ignoring poly logarithmic dependencies on n). In an unpublished
note, Darwish and Mehlhorn [5, 3] have shown how to extend the algorithm in [10] to
the general problem without going through the reduction. The resulting running time is
O(max(n,m)10 log2(max(n,m)UW )). They were unable to generalize the approach in [9].
Our Contribution: Our contribution is twofold: a combinatorial algorithm for the general
problem and examples that are difficult for the algorithms in [10, 9]. We give a combinato-
rial algorithm for the general problem with running time O((n + m)7 log3(nmUW )). The
algorithm refines the algorithm in [9] by several new ideas. We discuss them in Section 2.
In particular, in [9], the number of iterations compared to [10] is reduced by a factor of
Ω(n) by a modified price update rule . The modified update rule is subtle and heavily relies
on the fact that there is a one to one correspondence between an agent and a good (one
agent owns all of one good only) and this is not true in the general scenario and several of
their crucial arguments break down. We come up with a novel price update rule that also
highlights some new structure in the problem.
We also give examples that are difficult for the algorithms in [10, 9] amd where the equi-
librium prices are exponential in U . Both algorithms are iterative and needO(n5 log(U)) and
O(n4 log(nU)) iterations respectively. The examples force the algorithms into Ω˜(n4+ 13 log(U))
and Ω˜(n4 log(U)) iterations respectively (ignoring poly logarithmic dependencies on n).
They separate the two algorithms.
2 Determining the equilibrium price vector of the general linear
Arrow-Debreu market
For completeness we first show the well known reduction from the general case to the special
problem in [10, 9] (where each agent owns all of one good only). This reduction is well-known.
For each positive wij we create an agent bij and a good gij owned by this agent. There is
one unit of good gij . If wij = 0, there is no good gij and no agent bij . We interpret gij as
the goods gj owned by bi and bij as a copy of agent bi. We define the utility derived by the
agent bij from one unit of good g`k as u˜ij,`k = w`k · uik; here the factor uik reflects that bij
is a copy of agent bi and g`k is a copy of gk and the factor w`k reflects that b` owns w`k
units of good gk but there is only copy of good g`k.
I Lemma 1. Let p and f be the market clearing price vector and the corresponding money
flow for the above instance of the special case with nm agents and goods. Then p`kw`k does not
depend on `, but only on k. Let pˆk = p`kw`k and fˆik =
∑
j∈[m]
∑
`∈[n] fij,`k. Then pˆ and fˆ are
the market clearing price vector and corresponding money flow for general case with utility
matrix u and weight matrix w.
Proof. Assume w`kp`k >
whk
phk
. Let bij be any arbitrary agent. Then
u˜ij,`k
p`k
= w`k · uik
p`k
>
whk · uik
phk
= u˜ij,hk
phk
.
Hence agent bij prefers good g`k over good ghk. Since bij is arbitrary, ghk will not be sold
at all, a contradiction. Thus w`kp`k =
whk
phk
for all ` and h. Now, it is easy to verify that every
agent invests in goods that give him maximum utility to price ratio. Assume fˆik > 0. Then
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Algorithm 1 Combinatorial algorithm for determining the equilibirum prices in the general
linear Arrow-Debreu market
1: Set pi ← 1 ∀j ∈ [n].
2: Set ε← 1/(8 · (n+m)4(n+m)(UW )3(n+m)).
3: while ‖rf‖2 > ε , where f is a balanced flow in Np do
4: Let S be the set of high-surplus agents w.r.t f in Np.
5: x← min(xeq, x23, x24, x13, x2, xmax).
6:
Multiply prices of goods in Γ(S) by x and update f , p to f ′ and p′ as in (1) - (2) and
Np to Np′ .
7: Let f ′′ be the balanced flow in Np′ .
8: Set p← p′ and f ← f ′′.
9: end while
10: Round p to equilibrium prices.
for any arbitrary k′ and `′, there is a j and `, such that
uik
pˆk
= u˜ij,`k
w`k · pˆk =
u˜ij,`k
p`k
≥ u˜ij,`′k′
p`′k′
= u˜ij,`
′k′
w`′k′ · pˆk′ =
uik′
pˆk′
.
The equilibrium flow constraints are also easily verifiable,∑
i∈[n]
fˆik =
∑
i∈[n]
∑
j∈[m]
∑
`∈[n]
fij,`k =
∑
`∈[n]
p`k =
∑
`∈[n]
w`k · pˆk
∑
k∈[m]
fˆik =
∑
k∈[m]
∑
j∈[m]
∑
`∈[n]
fij,`k =
∑
j∈[m]
pij =
∑
j∈[m]
wij · pˆj J
We now present our algorithm that does not rely on this reduction.
2.1 The Algorithm
Figure 1 shows the algorithm. Similar to the algorithms in [7, 10, 9], the algorithm is
iterative and flow based. For the description of the algorithm, we need the concepts of an
equality network, of a balanced flow, of the set of high-surplus buyers, and of the flow- and
price-update.
Equality Network Np: For a price vector p the equality network Np is a flow network
with vertices s ∪ t ∪B ∪G and edges
(s, bi) with capacity
∑
j∈[m] wij · pj for all i ∈ [n].
(gj , t) with capacity
∑
i∈[n] wij · pj for all j ∈ [m].
(bi, gj) with capacity ∞ iff uij/pj ≥ uik/pk for all k ∈ [m].
For any B′ ⊆ B let Γ(B′) = {gj | (bi, gj) ∈ Np for some bi ∈ B′} denote the neighborhood
of B′ in Np (all the goods agents in B′ may invest on).
Surpluses and Surplus vector rf : Let f be a valid flow in the equality network Np, and
let fij , fsi and fjt denote the flow along the edge (bi, gj), (s, bi) and (gj , t) respectively. We
define the surplus rf (bi) of the agent bi and rf (gj) of the good gj , as rf (bi) =
∑
j∈[m] wij ·
pj − fsi and rf (gj) =
∑
i∈[n] wij · pj − fjt respectively. Surpluses are always non-negative.
We define the surplus vector rf ∈ Rn as 〈rf (b1), rf (b2), . . . rf (bn)〉.
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Balanced Flow: A balanced flow f is a valid flow in Np with minimum norm ‖rf‖22. Every
balanced flow is a maximum flow. Additionally, if f is a balanced flow and fij and fi′j are
positive, then the surpluses of the agents bi and bi′ are the same and if (bi, gj) and (bi′ , gj)
are edges of Np and rf (bi) > rf (bi′) then fi′j = 0. This essentially follows from the fact that
the L2 norm of a vector reduces as the components move closer to each other in magnitude
(while the L1 norm remain constant). The following algorithmic property of balanced flows
will be useful.
I Lemma 2. Balanced Flows can be computed with at most n max flow computations [7]
and by one parameterized flow computation [4].
High Surplus Agents S and Goods in High Demand Γ(S): Let f be a balanced flow
and assume that there is surplus. The high surplus edges and high demand goods w.r.t. f
in Np are defined exactly as in [9]. Renumber the agents in order of decreasing surplus so
that b1 has the highest surplus and bn has the lowest surplus. Let ` be minimal such that
rf (b`) > rf (b`+1) and for every k such that rf (b`) > rf (bk) ≥ rf (b`)/(1 + 1/n), fsk = 0 and
wkj = 0 for every gj ∈ Γ(S), where S = {b1, . . . , b`}. If no such ` exists, let ` = n. We refer
to S as the set of high surplus agents and to Γ(S) as the set of high demand goods. The
surplus of the goods in Γ(S) is zero since the agents in S have positive surplus. There is no
flow on edges (bi, gj) ∈ Np with bi 6∈ S and gj ∈ Γ(S).
The algorithm in [9] that determines S in time O(n2) can be easily generalized and we
do not discuss it here.
Price and Flow Update: Like the earlier combinatorial algorithms, our algorithm is a
multiplicative price update algorithm. It works in phases and in each phase we compute
the balanced flow f in Np and determine the high surplus agents S and high demand goods
Γ(S). We increase the prices of the goods in Γ(S) as well as the money flow into them by
the same factor x > 1 (so we change the flow f in Np to f ′ in Np′). Formally,
f ′ij =
{
x · fij gj ∈ Γ(S)
fij gj /∈ Γ(S) f
′
si =
{
x · fsi bi ∈ S
fsi bi /∈ S (1)
f ′jt =
{
x · fjt gj ∈ Γ(S)
fjt gj /∈ Γ(S) p
′
i =
{
x · pi gj ∈ Γ(S)
pi gj /∈ Γ(S) (2)
The Factor x: We define x = min(xeq, x23, x24, x13, x2, xmax), where the quantities on the
right are defined below.
Since we increase the prices of all the goods in Γ(S) by the same factor x, the only
equality edges that may disappear are the ones that connect an agent from B \ S to a good
from Γ(S). Since f is a balanced flow and the agents in S have strictly higher surplus than
the ones in B \ S, the edges from agents in B \ S to goods in Γ(S) in Np carry no flow and
hence them disappearing will not lead to a violation of the flow constraints. The new edges
that appear will connect an agent in S to a good in G \ Γ(S). Therefore we define,
xeq = min
{
uij
pj
· pk
uik
∣∣∣∣ bi ∈ S, (bi, gj) ∈ Np, gk /∈ Γ(S)}
This is the minimum x at which a new equality edge appears in the network.
Next we consider how the surpluses of the agents are affected. Observe that rf ′(bi) =
rf (bi)+x ·(
∑
gj∈Γ(S)(wijpj−fij)). Therefore all the surpluses vary linearly with x. We now,
introduce 5 classes of agents similar to the ones in [9]. Figure 1 illustrates this definition.
Type-1 agent: An agent is a type-1 agent if it belongs to S and its surplus increases by
the price change. Formally, bi is type-1 if bi ∈ S and
∑
gj∈Γ(S) wijpj >
∑
gj∈Γ(S) fij .
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type-1 and type-2
S
rf (bl)
type-4a
rf (bl)/(1 + 1/n)
type-3 and type-4b
Figure 1 The horizontal line indicates the agents ordered by decreasing surplus from left to
right. b` is the agent of smallest surplus in S. All agents with surplus in rf (b`), rf (b`)/(1 + 1/n)]
are type-4a agents. They have no outflow and do not own goods in Γ(S).
Type-2 agent: An agent is a type-2 agent if it belongs to S and its surplus does not
increase by the price change. Formally, bi is type-2 if bi ∈ S and
∑
gj∈Γ(S) wijpj ≤∑
gj∈Γ(S) fij .
Type-3 agent: An agent is type-3 agent if it does not belong to S and its surplus increases
by the price change, i.e., it partially owns a good in Γ(S). Formally, bi 6∈ S and wij > 0
for some gj ∈ Γ(S).
Type-4a agent: An agent is a type-4a agent if it does not belong to S and has no
ownership in a good in Γ(S) and its surplus is at least rmin/(1 + 1/n), where rmin is the
minimum surplus of any agent in S. Formally, bi 6∈ S, wij = 0 for all j ∈ Γ(S) and
rf (bi) ≥ rmin/(1 + 1/n). By definition of S such bi have no outflow, i.e., fsi = 0, and no
ownership of any good in Γ(S), i.e., wij = 0 for any j ∈ Γ(S).
Type-4b agent: An agent is a type-4b agent if it does not belong to S and has no
ownership in a good in Γ(S) and its surplus is strictly less than rmin/(1 + 1/n), where
rmin is the minimum surplus of any agent in S. Formally, bi 6∈ S, wij = 0 for all j ∈ Γ(S)
and rf (bi) < rmin/(1 + 1/n).
We abbreviate the above sets of agents of each type as T1, T2, T3, T4a and T4b. Notice
that the surpluses of agents in T4a ∪ T4b remain unaffected by increase of price of goods in
Γ(S). We now define x23, x24, x13 as the minimal x such that rf ′(bi) = rf ′(bj) for some
bi ∈ T2, bj ∈ T3 and bi ∈ T2, bj ∈ T4b and bi ∈ T1, bj ∈ T3 respectively. We also define x2 as
the minimal x when rf ′(bi) = 0 where bi ∈ T2.
Finally,
xmax =
{
1 + 1Rn3 whenmingj∈Γ(S) pj < Rn4mW
1 + 1Rkn2 whenmingj∈Γ(S) pj ≥ Rn4mW,
where k is the number of agents in S that partially own a good in Γ(S) and R = 8e2. Note
that k is at least the number of type-1 agents.1 We distinguish light and heavy iterations.
An iteration is light, if pj < Rn4mW for some good gj ∈ Γ(S) (some good in demand is not
heavily priced), and heavy if pj ≥ Rn4mW for all goods gj ∈ Γ(S) (all goods in demand are
heavily priced).
1 In [9], xmax is defined as
xmax =
{
1 + 1Rn3 if there are type-3 agents
1 + 1Rkn2 otherwise, where k = number of type-1 agents.
The revised definition we change the classification of iterations. We do not classify them based on the
type of the agents in S, but by looking at the smallest price of a good in Γ(S) and we have a larger k
(k is at least the number of type-1 agents).
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Effect of an Iteration: We multiply the prices of the goods in Γ(S) by x and update f ,
p to f ′ and p′ as in (1)-(4) and Np to Np′ . Note that the goods completely sold w.r.t. f in
Np are also completely sold with respect to Np′ . Maximizing and balancing the flow will
not increase the surplus of a good from zero to a positive value. Thus all goods that are
completely w.r.t. f in Np are also completely sold w.r.t. the balanced flow f ′′ in Np′ . The
2-norm of rf ′′ is at most the L2 norm of rf ′ .
We stop updating the prices once the L2 norm of the surplus vector is at most ε =
1/(8(n+m)4(n+m)(U ·W )3(n+m)).
2.2 Analysis of the Algorithm
Before we present the analysis of our algorithm we briefly indicate why the price-update
scheme used in [9] does not generalize. The algorithm in [9] reduces the number of iterations
of the algorithm in [10] by a multiplicative factor of Ω(n) by performing a more careful
selection of the set S and crucial change in the price update rule. In particular they set
xmax =
{
1 + 1Rn3 if there are type-3 agents
1 + 1Rkn2 otherwise, where k = number of type-1 agents.
Since in the special case, every agent owns only all of one good, k equals the number of
type-1 agents in S and the number of goods in Γ(S) in all iterations that do not involve a
type-3 agent. We enlist two crucial arguments that are necessary (not sufficient) to reduce
the number of iterations by Ω(n) from that in [10] and their dependencies on k as follows,
1. There is a decrease in the L2 norm of the surplus vector in every balancing iteration
without a type-3 agent. This argument crucially relies on k being equal to the number
of type-1 agents.
2. The total multiplicative increase of the L2 norm of the surplus vector in all xmax iterations
without a type-3 agent is at most (nU)O(n). This claim relies on the fact that k equals
the number of goods in Γ(S).
In the general scenario we do not have such one to one correspondence between the agents
and the goods. Therefore if we choose k to be either the number of type-1 agents in S or
the number of goods in Γ(S), then one of the claims from above will fail. Thus we need at
least a different classification of the iterations or a different choice of k than the ones used
in [9]. In our algorithm we do both and thereby highlighten more hidden structure in the
problem.
Like the algorithms in [10, 9], in every iteration Algorithm 1 only increases the prices of
goods that are completely sold (since f is a balanced flow and the agents in S have positive
surplus, the goods in Γ(S) will have zero surplus). Since the sum of surpluses of the agents
equals the sum of surpluses of the goods, both are therefore non-decreasing during a price
update. Also the goods completely sold w.r.t. f in Np also remain sold w.r.t. f ′′ in Np′ in
every iteration. Therefore the sum of surpluses of the agents is non-increasing throughout
the algorithm. Initially (when the price of every good gj is 1) this sum is at most nmW .
I Observation 3. The L1 norm of the surplus vector is non-increasing throughout the algo-
rithm and is at most nmW .
2.2.1 An Upper Bound on the Maximum Price
Observe that in every iteration of the algorithm there is a good with unit price. This follows
from the fact that the goods that are completely sold stay completely sold and since only
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the prices of goods that are completely sold are increased, the price of goods that are not
completely sold is equal to the initial price and hence equal to one. We now derive an upper
bound on the maximum price of a good.
I Lemma 4. At any time during the course of the algorithm the maximum price is at most
max(2, U)m−1 ·W 2m−2 and the maximum budget is at most max(2, U)m ·W 2m.
Proof. Let us renumber the goods in increasing order of their prices. We show that pi ≤
max(2, U)i−1 ·W 2i−2 by induction on i. The smallest price is 1 and this establishes the
induction base. Consider an arbitrary i and let Gˆ denote the set of goods {gi+1, ..., gm}
and Bˆ be the agents investing on the goods in Gˆ. We will derive a bound on pi+1. We
distinguish two cases.
Assume first that there is an agent in bh ∈ Bˆ that is also interested in a good in G \ Gˆ;
say bh invests on good gj ∈ Gˆ and is interested in good g` ∈ G \ Gˆ. Then uhj/pj ≥ uh`/p`
and hence pi+1 ≤ pj ≤ U · p` ≤ U · pi ≤ U ·max(2, U)i−1 ·W 2i−2 ≤ max(2, U)i ·W 2i.
Assume next that the agents in Bˆ are only interested in the goods in Gˆ. Then there must
be a good in Gˆ, say gk, that is partially owned by an agent in B \ Bˆ. Otherwise, the agents
in Bˆ will only be interested in goods completely owned by them. Therefore let bh ∈ B \ Bˆ
be the agent that partially owns gk. The budget mh of bh is at least whkpk and hence at
least pk. Since bh invests only in goods in G \ Gˆ, its budget is at most the total value of the
goods in G \ Gˆ. Thus
mh ≤W ·
∑
j∈[i]
pj ≤W ·
∑
j∈[i]
(
max(2, U)j−1W 2j−2
) ≤W max(2, U)iW 2i−1 = max(2, U)iW 2i
and hence pi+1 ≤ pk ≤ max(2, U)iW 2i. The maximum budget of an agent is at most W
times the total price of all goods and hence is bounded byW ·∑j∈[m] (max(2, U)j−1 ·W 2j−2) ≤
max(2, U)m ·W 2m. J
In particular, when n = m and w is an identity matrix, we have an upper bound of
max(2, U)n−1 for the highest price of a good in contrast to max(n,U)n in [10, 9]. Also note
that the maximum price of a good and the maximum budget of an agent is independent
of the number of agents. We now separately bound the xmax-iterations (x = xmax) and
balancing iterations (x < xmax).
2.2.2 Bounding the number of xmax-iterations
In this section we will be bounding the light and the heavy xmax-iterations separately. For
bounding both classes of iterations, we use upper bounds on the prices of the goods. A more
aggressive price update scheme is used for the heavy xmax-iterations as the prices of all goods
in Γ(S) in such iterations are high. Such aggressive price update may apparently result in
a significant multiplicative increase in the L2 norm of the surplus vector. We address this
concern in the next subsection. We first show that xmax-iterations where there is at least
one type-3 agent are light.
I Lemma 5. xmax-iterations with at least one type-3 agent are light.
Proof. Let bi be a type-3 agent. Then there is a gj ∈ Γ(S) with wij > 0. The additive
increase in the surplus of a type-3 agent bi during an xmax-iteration is at least wij · pj/Rn3.
Since the total surplus is always at most nmW (by Observation 3), the increase in the
surplus of any agent is at most nmW . This immediately implies that pj ≤ Rn4mW . J
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Now we bound the number of light xmax-iteration.
I Lemma 6. The number of light xmax-iterations is at most 10R2n3m log(nmW ).
Proof. Assume otherwise. Then there exists a good gj that is the minimum priced good in
Γ(S) in more than 10R2n3 log(nmW ) iterations. Before the last such iteration, pj > (1 +
1
Rn3 )10R
2n3 log(nmW ) > e5R log(nmW ) = n5Rm5RW 5R > Rn4mW , which is a contradiction.
The second to last inequality uses the fact that 1 + x > e x2 for 0 < x ≤ 1. J
We turn to heavy xmax-iterations. For such iterations, there exists no type-3 agent and
hence the goods in Γ(S) are completely owned by the agents in T1 ∪ T2. Thus∑
bi∈T1∪T2
∑
gj∈Γ(S)
fij =
∑
gj∈Γ(S)
∑
i∈T1∪T2
wijpj =
∑
bi∈T1
∑
gj∈Γ(S)
wij · pj +
∑
bi∈T2
∑
gj∈Γ(S)
wij · pj ,
and hence∑
bi∈T1
∑
gj∈Γ(S)
(wij · pj − fij) =
∑
bi∈T2
∑
gj∈Γ(S)
(fij − wij · pj). (3)
Note that type-1 and type-2 agents can own goods outside of Γ(S). However the above
relation will help us prove that this “excess budget” is at most nmW . In fact the following
lemma plays a pivotal role to bound the multiplicative increase in the L2 norm of the surplus
vector in the next subsubsection.
I Lemma 7. For every agent bi ∈ S in a heavy xmax-iteration,
∑
gj /∈Γ(S) wijpj ≤ nmW .
Proof. For bi ∈ S, we have rf (bi) =
∑
gj 6∈Γ(S) wijpj +
∑
gj∈Γ(S)(wijpj − fij). For bi ∈ T1,
this implies
∑
gj 6∈Γ(S) wijpj ≤ rf (bi) ≤ nmW . For bi ∈ T2, using (3)∑
gj 6∈Γ(S)
wijpj = rf (bi) +
∑
gj∈Γ(S)
(fij − wijpj) ≤ rf (bi) +
∑
bh∈T2
∑
gj∈Γ(S)
(fhj − whjpj)
= rf (bi) +
∑
bh∈T1
∑
gj∈Γ(S)
(whjpj − fhj) ≤ rf (bi) +
∑
bh∈T1
rf (bh) ≤ nmW.
J
In a heavy xmax-iteration, the price of any good in Γ(S) is at least Rn4mW and hence
the budget of any agent that partially owns a good in Γ(S) is at least that much. By the
above, the ownership of the goods outside Γ(S) contribute very little to the budget of such
agents. Thus any multiplicative increment on the prices of the goods in Γ(S) will inflict an
almost equal multiplicative increase in the budget of such agents.
I Lemma 8. The number of heavy xmax-iterations is O(n3m · log(WU)).
Proof. Consider any heavy xmax iteration and let mi denote the budget of agent bi. For any
agent bi that partially owns a good in Γ(S), mi ≥ Rn4mW . The budget mi of any agent bi
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that partially owns a good in Γ(S), increases as follows (new budget denoted by m′i):
m′i =
∑
gj /∈Γ(S)
wijpj + (1 +
1
Rkn2
) ·
∑
gj∈Γ(S)
wijpj
≥ (1 + 1
Rkn2
) · (1 + 1
n3
)−1 · (1 + 1
n3
) ·
∑
gj∈Γ(S)
wijpj
= (1 + 1
Rkn2
) · (1 + 1
n3
)−1 ·
 ∑
gj∈Γ(S)
wijpj +
∑
gj∈Γ(S) wijpj
n3

≥ (1 + 1
Rkn2
) · (1 + 1
n3
)−1 ·
 ∑
gj∈Γ(S)
wijpj + nmW
 since ∑
gj∈Γ(S)
wijpj ≥ Rn4mW
≥ (1 + 1
Rkn2
) · (1 + 1
n3
)−1 ·
 ∑
gj∈Γ(S)
wijpj +
∑
gj /∈Γ(S)
wijpj
 since ∑
gj 6∈Γ(S)
wijpj ≤ nmW
≥ (1 + Ω( 1
kn2
)) ·mi.
Let M =
∏
i∈[n]mi. Since mi ≤ (max(2, U)W 2)m we have log(M) ≤ nm log(UW ) always.
Also logM ≥ 0 initially. At any heavy xmax iteration, log(M) increases by a additive factor
of log((1 + Ω( 1kn2 ))k) ∈ Ω( 1n2 ). Since log(M) is non-decreasing in every iteration of the
algorithm (since the prices of the goods and the budgets of the agents only increase), the
number of heavy xmax-iterations is O(n3m log(WU)). J
We have now bounded the total number of xmax-iterations by O(n3m log(nmUW )).
2.2.3 On the Increase in the L2-Norm of the Surplus Vector in the
xmax-Iterations
The L2 norm of the surplus vector is minimal for the balanced flow. We just look at the
difference in the L2 norm of the surpluses with respect to the flows f in Np and f ′ in Np′
(Updated flow as in 1 - (2)) . Note that this difference in surplus is at least as large as the
difference between the L2 norm of the surplus vector with respect to f in Np and f ′′ in Np′
(balanced flow in Np′ in Algorithm 1). This suffices as we are upper bounding the difference
in the L2 norm of the surplus vector in this section.
In a light xmax-iteration, the L2 norm of the surplus vector increases at most by a factor
of (1+O( 1n3 )) and thus the total multiplicative increase in the L2 norm of the surplus vector
resulting from such iterations is (1 +O( 1n3 ))O(n
3m·log(nmW )) = (nmW )O(m).
We now bound the multiplicative increase resulting from heavy xmax-iterations. Despite
the more aggressive price update scheme in heavy xmax-iterations, we can assure the same
multiplicative increase. As in [9] we wish to prove that the ratio of the highest to the lowest
surplus of the agents in S is at most 1 + O( kn )). One possible approach is to show that
the number of distinct surpluses in S is O(k) (in that case the ratio will be (1 + 1n )O(k) =
1 + O( kn )). In [9], this is relatively easy to argue, as goods and agents are in one-to-one
correspondence and all agents having positive outflow to a good g have same surplus (by
the property of balanced flow). This immediately implies that there are at most 2k distinct
surpluses of the agents in S (additional k for agents with zero outflow that own one of the
goods in Γ(S)). This argument does not hold in the general scenario as the number of
XX:10 Combinatorial Algorithms for General Linear Arrow-Debreu Markets
goods can be much larger |S|. However Lemma 7 gives us a useful structure in the equality
network.
I Lemma 9. The total multiplicative increase resulting in the L2 norm of the surplus vector
in heavy xmax-iterations is (WU)O(m).
Proof. Let S′ be the set of agents in S that partially own some good in Γ(S) and k = |S′|.
Let S′′ be the set of agents in S with positive outflow. Any agent in S′ has a budget of at
least Rn4mW (follows from the definition of heavy xmax iteration) and therefore has positive
outflow (since its surplus is at most nmW by Observation 3). Thus S′ ⊆ S′′. By Lemma 7,
the budget of any agent in S \ S′ is at most nmW and hence the total outflow from agents
in S \ S′ is at most n2mW . Therefore any good in Γ(S) must have inflow from an agent in
S′ and hence the surplus of any agent in S′′ is equal to the surplus of some agent in S′.
Let r1 > r2 > . . . > rh with h ≤ k be the distinct surplus values of the agents in
S′′. Agents in S \ S′′ have no outflow and no ownership of any good in Γ(S). Therefore
ri+1 ≥ ri/(1 + 1/n) by definition of S for 1 ≤ i < h.
From ri ≤ (1 + 1n )ri+1 for all i, we conclude r1 ≤ (1 + 1n )krh ≤ (1 + 2kn )rh. Therefore for
any type-1 agent bi, we can claim that rf (bi) < (1+ 2kn )rh. Let rf ′ be the surplus vector after
the xmax-iteration. Since there are no type-3 agents in this iteration, only the surpluses of
the type-1 and type-2 agents belonging to S′′ are affected (Agents belonging to S \ S′′ have
no ownership of goods in Γ(S) and no outflow also, so their surpluses are unchanged when
we change f to f ′) . Let δi denote the increase in the surplus of a type-1 agent bi and let
µj denote the decrease of surplus of a type-2 agent bj . Note that
∑
bi∈T1 δi =
∑
bi∈T2 µi ≤
1
Rkn2
∑
bi∈T1 rf (bi). Then,
‖rf ′‖22 − ‖rf‖22 =
∑
bi∈T1
((rf (bi) + δi)2 − rf (bi)2)−
∑
bi∈T2
(rf (bi)2 − (rf (bi)− µi)2)
= 2
∑
bi∈T1
rf (bi)δi − 2
∑
bi∈T2
rf (bi)µi +
∑
bi∈T1
δ2i +
∑
bi∈T2
µ2i
≤ 2r1
∑
bi∈T1
δi − 2rh
∑
bi∈T2
µi +
∑
bi∈T1
δ2i +
∑
bi∈T2
µ2i
≤ 2(r1 − rh)
∑
bi∈T1
δi + 2
(∑
bi∈T1
δi
)2
≤ 2((1 + 2k
n
)rh − rh)
∑
bi∈T1
1
Rkn2
· rf (bi) + 2 1
R2k2n4
(∑
bi∈T1
rf (bi)
)2
≤ 4
Rn3
∑
bi∈T1
rf (bi)2 + n · 2
R2k2n4
∑
bi∈T1
rf (bi)2,
Thus ‖rf ′‖22 ∈ (1 +O( 1n3 ))‖rf‖22. Therefore the multiplicative increase in any heavy xmax-
iterations is 1 +O( 1n3 ). Thus the total multiplicative increase in the L2 norm of the surplus
vector in all heavy xmax iterations is at most (1 +O( 1n3 ))O(n
3m log(WU)) ∈ O(WU)O(m). J
Thus the total multiplicative increase in all xmax-iterations is at most (nmUW )O(m).
2.2.4 Balancing Iterations
In the balancing iterations x < xmax. First we discuss the case when x = min(x23, x24, x13, x2).
Since the L1 norm of the surplus vector is non-increasing during such an iteration (by Obser-
vation 3), the total decrease in the surplus of the type-2 agents is at least the total increase
B.R. Chaudhury, and K. Mehlhorn XX:11
in the surpluses of the type-1 and type-3 agents. So now we quantify the decrease in the
L2 norm of the surplus during such an iteration. Let rmin denote the lowest surplus of an
agent in S and rmax denote the highest surplus of a type-3 or type-4b agent. Notice that
the highest surplus of any agent and hence any agent in S is at most e · rmin and that
rmax ≤ rmin/(1 + 1/n).
Each type-1 agent’s surplus increases at most by a multiplicative factor of 1 + 1/Rkn2.
Every type-1 agent partially owns at least one good in Γ(S) and therefore, k is at least
the number of type-1 agents in B(S). Thus the total increase in the sum of squares of the
surpluses as a result of increase in the surpluses of the type-1 agents is
∑
bi∈T1(1/Rkn
2) ·
rf (bi)2 which is at most e2r2min/Rn2.
The surplus of the type-2 and the type-3 agents move closer to each other and the
decrease in the former is at least as large as the increase in the latter. Therefore, the sum
of their surpluses does not increase. We now quantify the decrease in the sum of squares of
their surpluses. Let δi denote the decrease in the surplus of a type-2 agent bi and µj the
increase in surplus of a type-3 agent bj . Let rf ′ be the new surplus vector (w.r.t flow f ′).
Then the change in the sum of squares of type-2, type-3 and type-4 agents is∑
bi∈T2
((rf (bi)− δi)2 − rf (bi)2)) +
∑
bi∈T3
((rf (bi) + µi)2 − rf (bi)2))
=
∑
bi∈T2
(−2rf (bi)δi + δ2i ) +
∑
bi∈T3
(2rf (bi)µi + µ2i ))
=
∑
bi∈T2
−rf (bi)δi +
∑
bi∈T3
rf (bi)µi −
∑
bi∈T2
δi(rf (bi)− δi) +
∑
bi∈T3
µi(rf (bi) + µi)
For any balancing iteration we have that minbi∈T2(rf (bi)− δi) ≥ maxbi∈T3(rf (bi) + µi) and∑
bi∈T2 δi ≥
∑
bi∈T3 µi. This implies that
∑
bi∈T2 δi(rf (bi) − δi) ≥
∑
bi∈T3 µi(rf (bi) + µi).
Notice that rmin is minbi∈T1∪T2 rf (bi) and rmax is maxbi∈T3∪T4b rf (bi). Therefore, we may
continue
≤ −rmin
∑
bi∈T2
δi + rmax
∑
bi∈T3
µi
≤ −(rmin − rmax) ·
∑
bi∈T2
δi ≤ −(rmin − rmax) ·
(
∑
bi∈T2 δi +
∑
bi∈T3 µi)
2 .
Now, whenever x = min(x23, x24, x13, x2),
∑
bi∈T2 δi +
∑
bi∈T3 µi ≥ rmin − rmax. Thus
≤ − (rmin − rmax)
2
2 ≤ −
r2min
2(n+ 1)2 ≤ −
r2min
4n2 .
Therefore ‖rf ′‖22 − ‖rf‖22 ≤ e
2r2min
Rn2 − r
2
min
4n2 = − r
2
min
4n2 (Recall that R = 8e2). Since ‖rf‖22 ≤
ne2r2min, we have
‖rf ′‖22 ≤ (1− Ω(
1
n3
))‖rf‖22.
Now we look into the case when x = xeq. We update the flow exactly the same way as
in [9]. The new equality edge will involve a type-1 agent or a type-2 agent. But after we
update the flow, we are in a similar situation as above, with a possibility that the surplus
of a few type-1 agents may even decrease and be equal to that of a few type-3 agents. Like
earlier the sum of surpluses of the agents is non-increasing here too and all arguments for
the decrease in the sum of squares of the agents remain the same. The flow adjustment is
exactly identical to the one in [9].
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I Lemma 10. The total number of balancing iterations is O(n3 max(n,m) log(nmUW ))
Proof. Every balancing iteration results in a multiplicative decrease of 1 − Ω( 1n3 ) in the
L2 norm of the surplus. The total multiplicative increase as a result of xmax-iterations is
(nmUW )O(max(n.m)). Initially ‖rf‖2 is at most
√
n(mW )2 and the algorithm terminates
with ‖rf‖2 being ε. Therefore the total number of balancing iterations is at most
log1−Ω( 1
n3 )
(1
ε
·
√
n(mW )2 · (nmUW )O(m)) = O(n3 max(n,m) log(nmUW )). J
So now we have bounded all the iterations of our algorithm.
I Theorem 11. The total number of iterations is O(n3 max(n,m) · log(nWU)).
2.2.5 Extraction of Equilibrium Prices and Perturbation of Utilities
In [10] is was shown for the special case (n = m and w the identity matrix) that once the
total surplus is sufficiently small, the equality network for the current price vector p is the
equality network for the equilibrium price vector pˆ. The equilibrium price vector can then
be extracted by solving a linear system. Darwish [3] showed that the same approach also
works for the general case.
I Theorem 12. Consider any instance of the general linear Arrow-Debreu market with n
agents, m goods, utility matrix u and weight matrix w. If p is a price vector such that ‖rf‖ at
most 1/(8 · (n+m)4(n+m)(UW )3(n+m)) for any balanced flow f in Np, then the equilibrium
price vector p∗ can be determined in O((n+m)4 · log(UW )).
[9] achievesO(n2) time for determining the balanced flow in every iteration by keeping the
Equality Network acyclic at every point in time in the algorithm. This improvement, after
minor adaptions, also applies to the general case. [9] achieves O(n2) time for determining
the balanced flow in every iteration by keeping the Equality Network acyclic at every point
in time in the algorithm. The improvement is achieved by slightly perturbing every non-
zero utility uij to u˜ij(δ), where δ > 0 and limδ→0+ u˜ij(δ) = uij . After performing the
perturbation, they determine the solution p˜ (running their algorithm). Henceforth they
efficiently determine the equilibrium price vector for the unperturbed utilities from p˜ and
Np˜. This improvement, after minor adaptions, also applies to the general case. We start
with a review of [10] and refer to [10, 3] for details.
Let p be a set of prices. We extend Np to the extended equality network Nˆp by adding
the edges {(bi, gj)|wij > 0, i ∈ [n], j ∈ [m]}. We call p canonical if the extended equality
network is connected and the minimum price of a good is equal to one. As in [10, 3], we can
now make the following claim.
I Lemma 13. Let p′ be any equilibrium price vector. There is a canonical price vector p,
such that Ep′ ⊆ Ep where Ep′ and Ep are the set of edges of Np′ and Np respectively.
Proof. Let f be the money flow corresponding to p′. Scaling the prices will make the
minimum price equal to one. Let K0 be a component containing a good with price one. As
long as there is a component from K0, we choose one such component, say K, and increase
the budgets of the agents, the prices of the goods, and all flows in K by a mutiplicative
factor x until a new equality edge emerges connecting an agent from K to a good not in K.
This reduces the number of components in Nˆp′ . Continuing the above operation we arrive
at a canonical equilibrium price vector and the corresponding money flow. J
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Let p be the canonical equilibrium price vector obtained in this way and let T be any
spanning forest of the equality network Np. Then for any agent bi with neighbors gj1 to gjk
in Tp, p must satisfy
uij1 · pj` − uij` · pj1 = 0 for 2 ≤ ` ≤ k. (4)
For all components K of Np (not the extended equality network) the total budget has to be
equal to the total value of the goods, i.e.,
∑
bi∈K
∑
j∈[m]
wijpj −
∑
gj∈K
∑
i∈[n]
wijpj = 0 (5)
Also there is one good gi with unit price and therefore
pi = 1 (6)
It turns out that the above set of equations are also sufficient for p to be a canonical
equilibrium price vector.
I Lemma 14. The system of equations in (4), (6), and all but one equation in (5) has full
rank.
Proof. Shown in [10, 3]. J
Let p˜ be the canonical equilibrium price vector corresponding to the perturbed utilities.
Let A˜ be the coefficient matrix of the system of equations in (4), (5) and (6) with utilities in
(4) being the perturbed utilities u˜. Note that A˜p˜ = X where the “unit-vector”X corresponds
to the right hand side of the equations. Let A be the matrix obtained by replacing every
occurrence of u˜ij in A˜ by uij for all i ∈ [n], j ∈ [m]. Notice that Ap˜ = X˜ where X˜ is obtained
from X by replacing the right hand side of the equations in (4) by
(uij1 − u˜ij`)pj` + (u˜ij` − uij1)pj1 .
Also notice that ‖X−X˜‖∞ ≤ γ′ where γ′ = 2γ(max(2, U)m−1W 2m−2) and γ = maxi∈[n],j∈[m]
|uij − u˜ij |. We can compute the equilibirum price vector corresponding to the unperturbed
utilities efficiently as long as γ is sufficiently small. In particular for γ ∈ 1/Θ((MUW )4m) where
M = m ·max(n,m) we have the following lemma.
I Lemma 15. Let p be a vector such that Ap = X where X is the unit-vector corresponding
to the right hand sides of the equations in (4), (5) and (6). Then p is also the equilibrium
price vector corresponding to the unperturbed utilities.
Proof. Note that A is an m × m integral matrix with every entry upper bounded by
max(U,max(n,m)W ). Let M = m ·max(n,m) and D be the determinant of A. We have
D ≤ (MUW )m. We have Ap = X and Ap˜ = X˜. Thus we can express p = 1D q and p˜ = 1D q˜
where both q and q˜ are integral vectors. Also we have A(p− p˜) = X− X˜. Therefore we have
p− p˜ = A−1(X − X˜) = 1/D ·B(X − X˜), where B is an integral matrix with largest entry at
most m!(U max(n,m)W )m . In particular, for any i ∈ [m] we have |pi − p˜i| ≤ (MUW )mγ′/D.
This also implies that |qi − q˜i| ≤ (MUW )mγ′. Note that to prove that p is an equilibrium
price vector corresponding to the unperturbed utilities, it suffices to show that the min-cut
in Np is
∑
i∈[n]
∑
j∈[m] wijpj . To this end we first show that the set of edges in Np˜ is a
subset of that in Np.
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I Observation 16. Let Ep˜ and Ep be the set of edges in Np˜ and Np respectively. We have
Ep˜ ⊆ Ep.
Proof. First observe that the edges (s, bi) for all i ∈ [n] and (gj , t) for all j ∈ [m] belong to
both Ep˜ and Ep. We now argue about the bang-for-buck edges. To this end, consider any
edge (bi, gj) ∈ Ep˜. We have u˜ijp˜j ≥ u˜ikp˜k for all k ∈ [m]. Or equivalently we have u˜ij q˜k ≥ u˜ikq˜j
for all k ∈ [m]. Note that to show (bi, gj) ∈ Np, it suffices to show that uijqk ≥ uikqj for all
k ∈ [m]. Using that γ  1/Θ((MUW )3m) and γ′  1/Θ((MUW )2m) we have
uijqk ≥ (u˜ij − γ)q˜k + (u˜ij − γ)(qk − q˜k)
≥ u˜ij q˜k − γq˜k − U(MUW )mγ′
≥ u˜ikq˜j − γq˜k − U(MUW )mγ′
≥ (uik − γ)qj + (uik − γ)(q˜j − qj)− γq˜k − U(MUW )mγ′
≥ uikqj − γ(qj + q˜k)− 2U(MUW )mγ′
> uikqj − 1
From the integrality of the matrix u and the vector q we have that uijqk ≥ uikqj or equiva-
lently uijpj ≥ uikpk for all k ∈ [m]. Therefore we have Ep˜ ⊆ Ep. J
In particular, any cut Z in Np is also a cut in Np˜. Consider any edge e ∈ Ep˜ ∩Ep. Let c˜(e)
denote the capacity of e in Np˜ and c(e) denote the capacity of e in Np. For any cut Z of Np
and Np˜, we define c(Z) and c˜(Z) analogously. We now make the following observation.
I Observation 17. Let Z be the min-cut inNp. We have |c(Z)−c˜(Z)| ≤ (n+m)2W (MUW )mγ′/D.
Proof. Consider any edge e ∈ Ep˜ ∩ Ep. Observe that
If e = (bi, gj) for any i ∈ [n], j ∈ [m] then c(e) = c˜(e) =∞.
If e = (gj , t) for any j ∈ [m], then
c˜(e) =
∑
i∈[n]
wij p˜j =
∑
i∈[n]
wijpj +
∑
i∈[n]
wij(p˜j − pj) = c(e) +
∑
i∈[n]
wij(p˜j − pj).
Since |p′j − pj | ≤ (MUW )mγ′/D we have that |c(e)− c˜(e)| ≤ nW (MUW )mγ′/D.
If e = (s, bi) for any i ∈ [n], by a symmetric argument we have |c(e)−c˜(e)| ≤ mW (MUW )mγ′/D.
Therefore, |c(Z) − c˜(Z)| ≤ |Z| · (n+m)W (MUW )mγ′/D. Since Z is the min-cut it does not
contain the bang per buck edges (as their capacity is ∞). Hence |Z| is at most n + m and
the claim follows. J
Consider the cut Z = (s,B∪G∪t). Z is a min-cut inNp˜. Note that c(Z) =
∑
i∈[n]
∑
j∈[m] wijqj/D.
Assume that Z is not the min-cut in Np and let Z ′ be the min-cut. Then we have
c(Z ′) ≤ (
∑
i∈[n]
∑
j∈[m] wijq
′
j−1)/D. We now upper bound c˜(Z ′). We have (the first inequality
uses Observation 17)
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c˜(Z ′) ≤ c(Z ′) + (n+m)
2W (MUW )mγ′
D
≤
∑
i∈[n]
∑
j∈[m] wijqj
D
− 1
D
+ (n+m)
2W (MUW )mγ′
D
=
∑
i∈[n]
∑
j∈[m] wij q˜j
D
+
∑
i∈[n]
∑
j∈[m] wij(qj − q˜j)
D
− 1
D
+ (n+m)
2W (MUW )mγ′
D
≤
∑
i∈[n]
∑
j∈[m]
wij +
∑
i∈[n]
∑
j∈[m]
wij
(MUW )mγ′
D
− 1
D
+ (n+m)
2W (MUW )mγ′
D
≤ c˜(Z)− 1
D
+ 2(n+m)
2W (MUW )mγ′
D
< c˜(Z),
a contradiction. Thus Z is a min-cut in Np as well and has capacity
∑
i∈[n]
∑
j∈[m] wijpj . J
By the above, the equilibrium price vector corresponding to the unperturbed utilities can
be determined from p˜ and Np˜ by solving the system Ap = b where A has full rank and the
absolute value of every entry is bounded by max(U,max(n,m)W ). This can be achieved
in O(m3) arithmetic operations and in time O(m4 · log(nmUW )). Therefore we can use
the same perturbation scheme used in [9] and ensure that the equality network is acyclic at
every iteration of our algorithm. This ensures that we can determine the balanced flow in
O((n+m)2).
2.3 Summary
I Theorem 18. The market clearing price vector for the general Arrow-Debreu market can
be determined with O((n+m)6 log(nmWU)) arithmetic operations.
Proof. We perturb the utility matrix following the same perturbation as in [9]. This per-
turbation ensures that the equality network is acyclic at any point in time in the algorithm.
Thereafter we run Algorithm 1 until ‖rf‖ < 1/(8 · (n+m)4(n+m)(UW )3(n+m)). This in-
volves O(n3m log(nWU)) iterations. In each iteration we can determine x23, x24, x13,
x2 and xeq in O(n2) comparisons. The balanced flow can also be determined by n + m
max flow calls in Np. Since Np is acyclic (due to the perturbation), we can compute
each max flow in O(n + m) arithmetic operations as in [9]. Thus every iteration involves
O((n + m)2) arithmetic operations and comparisons. Therefore Algorithm 1 terminates
performing O((n + m)6 log(nmWU)) arithmetic operations and comparisons. Thereafter
we perform extraction as in Theorem 12 in time O((n + m)4 log(nmUW )) and determine
the equilibrium prices for the perturbed utilities. We then determine equilirbium prices
corresponding to the original utilities from the equilibrium prices of the perturbed utili-
ties performing O(m3) arithmetic operations in O(m4 log(UW )) time. Overall we perform
O((n+m)6 log(nmWU)) arithmetic operations and comparisons. J
To achieve the polynomial running time we can follow the same strategy used in [10].
where we restrict the prices and the update factor to powers of 1 + 1/L where L has poly-
nomial bit length (linear in n+m). This guarantees that all arithmetic is done on rationals
of polynomial bitlength. This can be adapted to the perturbation as well [9].
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Figure 2 Utility matrix for n = 6. The agents are the green nodes on the left and the goods
are the red nodes on the right. Agent bi owns good gi. The blue edges represent utility U and the
orange ones represent utility one
3 Lower Bounds for the Algorithms in [10, 9]
In this section, we construct non-trivial instances that make the equilibrium prices expo-
nential in U and forces the algorithms in [10, 9] to execute large number of iterations.
3.1 Instances where Algorithm in [9] requires Ω(n4 logU) Iterations
We construct an In comprises of a set of agents B = {b1, b2, ..., bn} and a set of goods
G = {g1, g2, ..., gn}, and n is even. There is exactly one unit of each good (W = 1) and
agent bi only owns one unit of good gi. We now define the utility matrix as follows: ui,i−1 =
U for 2 ≤ i ≤ n, ui,i+1 = 1 for 2 ≤ i ≤ n − 1, and u1,1 = u1,2 = U . ui,j = 0 for every
other pair of (i, j). See Figure 2.
I Observation 19. The instance In is irreducible or equivalently for every P ⊂ B, there
exists bi ∈ P ,bj /∈ P such that ui,j > 0.
Proof. For contradiction let us assume that there exists a P ⊂ B, such that the agents in
P are only interested in the goods they own. If P contains b1 then it must contain b2. The
agent bi is interested in the good gi+1 and hence bi ∈ P implies bi+1 ∈ P . Thus P = B,
which is a contradiction. Hence P cannot contain b1. If P contains any agent bi 6= b1 then P
must also contain bi−1, implying that P must contain b1, which is again a contradiction. J
I Theorem 20. For the instance In, we have the ratio of the maximum to the minimum
price of a good at equilirbium is Ω(UΩ(n)).
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Proof. Let p be the market clearing price vector with pi denoting the price of good gi, and f
be the money flow at equilibrium. Since the only agent interested in gn is bn−1 , pn−1 ≥ pn.
We now discuss two disjoint scenarios,
pn = pn−1. In this case we claim that for every even i, pi−1 = pi ≥ U · pi+1 = U · pi+2
and fi,i−1 = fi−1,i = pi = pi−1. For the base case, i = n we have pn = pn−1 and
fn,n−1 = fn−1,n = pn = pn−1. For the inductive step we assume that the claim holds for
i + 2. Since gi+2 is a bang per buck good for bi+1, pi ≥ U · pi+2 = U · pi+1. Since the
only other agent interested in gi is bi−1 we may conclude that pi−1 ≥ pi (bi−1 is the only
agent investing in gi). But then again, since the only good bi invests in is gi−1, pi−1 ≤ pi.
This implies that pi−1 = pi ≥ U · pi+1 = U · pi+2 and fi,i−1 = fi−1,i = pi = pi−1.
pn−1 > pn. In this case we claim that for every even i, pi < pi−1 and pi−1 ≥ U ·pi+1. For
the base case i = n, this trivially holds. For the inductive step we assume that our claim
holds for i+2. Since pi+1 > pi+2, the agent bi+1 must invest in the good gi. This implies
that pi ≤ U · pi+2. Since pi+2 < pi+1, agent bi must invest in good gi+1. Therefore gi+1
is a bang per buck good for agent bi, implying that pi−1 ≥ U · pi+1 > U · pi+2 ≥ pi.
In either case, we have pi−1 ≥ Upi+1 for even i. Thus there are goods with price ratio equal
to U n2−1. J
Note that the algorithm in [10] never increases the price of a good more than a multiplicative
factor of (1+O(1/n3)). Thus the number of iterations is log1+O(1/Rn3) UΩ(n) ∈ Ω(n4 log(U)).
To prove that the algorithm in [10, 9] takes Ω(n4 log(U)) iterations, we first need to under-
stand the details of how the sets S (high surplus agents) and Γ(S) (high demand goods)
evolve throughout the iterations of the algorithm in [10, 9]. In particular we show that
there exists a good gi and its price is increased by a multiplicative factor of UΩ(n) in xmax
iterations with Ω(n) type-1 agents. Note that the price of any good is increased at most
by a multiplicative factor of 1 + O(1/n3) in any xmax iteration with Ω(n) type-1 agents.
Since the total price increase in such iterations is UΩ(n), the number of such iterations is
Ω(log1+O(1/Rn3) UΩ(n)) ∈ Ω(n4 log(U)).
We first give details on how the algorithm in [10] operates on In. This will also elucidate
why the algorithm in [9] and our algorithm will also incur the same running time. We start
with some observations:
I Observation 21. Let n be an even integer and pi be the price of gi and the budget of bi
for i ∈ [n]. For an even integer k < n,
pi = 1 k < i ≤ n,
1 ≤ pk = pk−1 ≤ pk−2 = pk−3 ≤ ......p4 = p3 ≤ p2 = p1.
The equality network Np comprises of the following edges in addition to the ones connecting
the agents to the source and the goods to the sink,
(bi, gi−1) 2 ≤ i ≤ n,
(bi, gi+1) 1 ≤ i ≤ k − 1,
(b1, g1).
Then, the surplus rf (bi) for an agent bi w.r.t a balanced flow f is
rf (bi) = 0 k + 1 < i ≤ n
rf (bi) = 1k+1 1 ≤ i ≤ k + 1.
Proof. Note that (s ∪ B ∪ Γ(B), {gn, t}) is a cut in the equality network with capacity∑
i∈[n−1] pi. Any flow that saturates the edges of this cut is a maximum flow. We give the
definition of such a flow f :
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fs,i = pi i ∈ [n] \ {k + 1},
fi,t = pi i ∈ [n− 1],
fi,i−1 = 1 k + 1 < i ≤ n,
fk+1,k = 0,
fi,i−1 = fi−1,i = pi = pi−1 for all even i ∈ [k],
f1,1 = 0.
Now we show how to transform this flow to get a balanced flow through a series of aug-
mentations. We denote the residual equality network with respect to the flow f as Np(f).
We refer to all the directed edges of the equality network as forward edges in Np(f), and
the reverse of the edges carrying positive flow as backward edges in Np(f). Capacity of any
forward edge is ∞ and that of the backward edge e is f(rev(e)). The maximum flow f is
balanced iff there exists no path from any bi to bj , in Np(f) where rf (bi) > rf (bj).
In our definition of f , we see that capacity of any backward edge in Np(f) is at least 1.
We also observe that rf (bk+1) = 1 and rf (bi) = 0 for all i 6= k. The following procedure
converts the maximum flow f into a balanced flow.
1. For every odd i ∈ [k] augment a flow of 1k+1 along the path bk+1 → gk → bk−1 → gk−2 →
....→ gi+1 → bi in Np(f). It can be verified easily that this is a valid path in the residual
equality network. This augmentation increases the surplus of agent bi from 0 to 1k+1 and
decreases the surplus of bk+1 by 1k+1 . See Figure 3b.
2. For every even i ∈ [1, k] augment a flow of 1k+1 along the path bk+1 → gk → bk−1 →
gk−2 → .... → g2 → b1 → g1 → b2 → g3 → .... → gi−1 → bi in Np(f). Like earlier,it
can be verified easily that this is a valid path in the residual equality network. This
augmentation increases the surplus of agent bi from 0 to 1k+1 and decreases the surplus
of bk+1 by 1k+1 . See Figure 3c.
The total flow augmented along any edge is at most kk+1 < 1. Since the backward
edges of Np(f) had capacity 1, they always remain in the residual network in all the flow
augmentations. Thus the above augmentations are valid and there would be a total of k
such augmentations. After the augmentations, we have rf (bi) = 1k+1 for all i ∈ [k + 1] and
rf (bi) = 0 otherwise. This is a balanced flow. J
Notice that in the above lemma the surplus remains the same, as long as the price vector
satisfies the necessary condition as mentioned in the observation, irrespective of the exact
price of the goods.
Now we give the reader an impression of how the price vector changes (See Figure 4).
The algorithm in [10] initializes all the prices to unity at the beginning. The equality
network and the price vector satisfy all the conditions mentioned in Observation 21, with
k = 2. Γ(S) = {g1, g2}. As a consequence of Observation 21, we can say that the increase
in prices of {g1, g2} does not change the surplus vector as long as the equality network does
not change. Thus the algorithm keeps increasing the prices until p1 = p2 = U and the
edges (b2, g3) and (b3, g4) appear. The new equality network and the updated price vector
again satisfy the conditions in Observation 21, with k = 4 and Γ(S) = {g1, g2, g3, g4}. Like
earlier the surplus vector does not change as long as the equality network does not change.
The algorithm increases the prices of {g1, g2, g3, g4} by a multiplicative factor of U and this
procedure continues. Henceforth we can make the following observation,
I Observation 22. Throughout the iterations of the algorithm in [10] on instance In, there are
no type-3 agents. When the equality Network changes for the ith time, S = {b1, b2, ..., b2i+1}
and {b1, b2, ..., b2i} are type-1 agents and b2i+1 is a type-2 agent.
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(a) The equality network Np and the surplus vector with respect to f . Here k = 4.
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(b) Augmenting flow of 1
k+1 along a path from b5 to b1 (odd i).
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(c) Augmenting flow of 1
k+1 along a path from b5 to b4 (even i).
Figure 3 The two different augmentations transforming the maximum flow f into a balanced
flow.
The algorithm in [9] achieves a factor n improvement on the number of iterations. This
is achieved by a careful selection of the set S (which is identical to the one presented in this
paper earlier) and a modified way of updating the prices as follows:
xmax =
{
1 + 1Rn3 if there are type-3 agents
1 + 1Rkn2 otherwise, where k = number of type-1 agents.
Now we show that the analysis of the number of iterations of [9] is tight upto a factor of
log(n).
I Theorem 23. The algorithm in [9] requires Ω(n4 logU) iterations on instance In.
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(a) During the first iteration.
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(b) The equality network changes for the first time. Edges (b2, g3) and (b3, g4) appear.
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(c) The equality network changes for the third time. Edges (b4, g5) and (b5, g6) appear.
Figure 4 Running the DM algorithm on the instance. The numbers on the left represent surplus
of the agents and that on the right the prices of the goods. The red nodes on the right represent
the set Γ(S) in every iteration.
Proof. Note that the equality network changes exactly like it did while running the algo-
rithm in [10]. At every stage of the iteration we can partition the agents B into B1 =
{bi|i ∈ [k + 1]} and B2 = B\B1. With all agents in B1 having the same surplus equal to
1/(k + 1) and agents in B2 having zero surplus. Thus there exists no agent bj , such that
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rf (bl) > rf (bj) ≥ rf (bl)/(1 + 1/n), when rf (bl) ∈ S. This proves that the set S evolves ex-
actly the same way throughout the iterations of the algorithm in [9] as it evolves throughout
the iterations of the algorithm in [10].
As stated before, throughout the algorithm there are no type-3 agents. Hence, always
we have xmax = 1 + 1/(Rkn2) where k equals the number of type-1 agents in the equality
network. After the equality network has changed O(n) times, the set Γ(S) will have Ω(n)
type-1 agents (Consequence of Observation 22) and then xmax = (1 + Ω(1/n3)) in every
iteration henceforth. These iterations must increase some prices further by a factor Ω(UΩ(n)).
This requires Ω(log(1+Ω( 1
n3 ))
(U)Ω(n)) = Ω(n4 · log(U)) further iterations. J
We next construct an instance I ′n that separates the two algorithms in [10, 9].
4 The instance separating the algorithms in [10] and [9]
In our previous example we observe that the price of one of the goods (g1) always increased
in every iteration. The question is are there instances when
1. There are Ω(n) goods with equilibrium prices in Ω(UΩ(n)),
2. Prices of each of the goods increase in different iterations.
Such instances could make the algorithm in [10] realize Ω(n5 log(U)) iterations. With this
intention in mind we first prove and claim certain useful facts and observations.
I Fact 24. The number of primes less than or equal to an integer x is Θ( xln(x) ).
I Lemma 25. If k1 and k2 are prime integers and k1 6= k2, and α1 < k1, α2 < k2 are
positive integers, then,
α1
k1
6= α2k2 .
α1
k1
/α2k2 ∈ [(1 + 1k1·k2 )−1, (1 + 1k1·k2 )].
Proof. Note that since both k1 and k2 are primes, the fraction k1/k2 cannot be reduced to
lower terms. Let β1/β2 be the reduced form of the fraction α1/α2. Now β1 < α1 < k1 and
β2 < α2 < k2. Thus β1/β2 6= k1/k2. Since reduced forms of the fractions are not equal,
α1/α2 6= k1/k2.
Since α1/k1 6= α2/k2, let us assume without loss of generality that α1/k1 > α2/k2.
In that case, α1/k1 − α2/k2 = (α1k2 − α2k1)/k1k2 ≥ 1/k1k2 ≥ 1/k1k2 · α2/k2 and hence
α1/k1 ≥ (1 + 1/k1k2) · α2/k2. Similarly if we assume α1/k1 < α2/k2 we can conclude
α2/k2 ≥ (1 + 1/k1k2) · α1/k1). J
We will see ahead that these fractions would be the values of the surpluses of a set of agents
and this ratio bound will help us identify the set of agents with high surplus (We refer to
the definition of agents with high surplus used in [10]).
I Observation 26. Let pi denote the budget of bi and price of gi. Also pi = 1 for all
i ∈ [n] \ [m] (for some m < n). Now, let us consider an equality Network Np with vertices
(s ∪B ∪G ∪ t), where B = {b1, b2, ..., bn} and G = {g1, g2, ...., gn} with edges as follows,
(s, bi) with capacity pi ∀i ∈ [n].
(gi, t) with capacity pi ∀i ∈ [n].
(bi, gj)with capacity ∞ ∀i ∈ [n] and j ∈ [m].
The surplus of the agent bi w.r.t. a balanced flow f in Np is rf (bi) = (n−m)/n.
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Proof. Note that the maximum flow is
∑
i∈[n] pi. Therefore for every balanced flow f , the
sum of the surpluses of the agents
∑
i∈[n] rf (bi) will be equal to
∑
i∈[n] pi−
∑
i∈[m] pi = n−m.
Clearly there is a flow that realizes this sum and has every surplus equal to (n−m)/n. J
What is crucial in the above observation is that this claim is independent of the actual values
of the prices of the goods in {gj | j ∈ [m]}. Before we construct our instance, we wish to give
the reader an impression of how the prices rise in the same. Consider the utility matrix in
Figure 5. So note that there are different green nodes (that correspond to different agents)
with the same label. So an agent is uniquely identified by the unordered pair of the block he
belongs to and the label of the node.
(See Figure 5) Initially the prices of all the goods are set to 1. The only edges present
in the equality network are the blue edges of the utilty matrix shown in Figure 5. After
computing the balanced flow, we can partition the agents into two blocks - block1 and
block2, as we see in the figure itself. The agents in block1 have a surplus of 45 and the
ones in block2 have 23 . Thus ratio of their surpluses equals
12
10 = 1 +
1
5 > 1 +
1
n , where
n here is 8.Thus during the first iteration S = block1 ( we refer to the S in [10]). We
increase the price of good g1 in block1 by 1 + 1Rn3 . However from Observation 3.3, we can
conclude that the surplus vector still remains the same for all nodes in block1 ( = 45 for
each). Thus the algorithm in [10] increases the price of good g1 in block1 until the equality
network changes (when its price = U). Thereafter agent b1 of block1 will be interested to
invest in all the goods except g1 of block2 . In the new equality network, the surplus of all
agents in block1 is zero and block2 is the new set of agents with high surplus. Like earlier,
the surplus of the agents in block2 does not change until, the equality network changes
(when the price of good g1 in block2 is U2). The important note is that the price rise
in both the blocks occur in disjoint iterations of the algorithm. The key idea is that we
can create instances where the agents can be partitioned into disjoint block based on their
surpluses. At any iteration of the algorithm, the ratio of the surpluses between any two
blocks would be greater than (1 + 1n ). Or in other words only one block is present in S at
every iteration. This way we can ensure that prices of goods in different blocks increase in
different iterations. Thus if we can partition the agents into k blocks (prices of goods in each
block being updated in disjoint iterations) we can ensure that the algorithm in [10] incurs
Ω(
∑
i∈[k] log1+ 1
R·n3
(U)i)) = Ω(n3 log(U) · (∑i∈[k] i) = Ω(n3k2 log(U)).
Constructing the Instance I ′n: Partitioning the Agents into Blocks and Defining
the Utility Matrix:
1. Initially set every u(bi, gj) = 0 for every agent bi and good gj .
2. For every prime i < n 13 and j < i, we have a blocki,j , comprising i agents (b1, blocki,j) to
(bi, blocki,j) and i goods (g1, blocki,j) to (gi, blocki,j). Agent (bk, blockij) owns (gk, blockij)
for all k ∈ [i].
3. Let u((bl, blocki,j), (gl′ , blocki′,j′)) denote the utility of agent (bl, blocki,j) from (gl′ , blocki′,j′).
For every blocki,j , we set u((bl, blocki,j), (gm, blocki,j)) = 2U for all l ∈ [i] and all m ∈ [j].
4. For every block blocki,j , we call the goods (gm, blocki,j) high-demand goods of blocki,j if
and only if m ∈ [j], (as all agents in blocki,j are interested in them) and the remaining
goods as low-demand goods of blocki,j .
5. Let pi be the sequence of blocks sorted in decreasing order of i−ji . Let pii denotes the
ith block in the sequence pi, and |pi| denotes the number of length of the sequence which
equals the number of blocks ∈ Θ( n
2
3
log2(n) ) (Follows from Fact 3.1).
6. For all j ∈ [|pi|] we set u((bl, pi1), (gm, pij)) = 2, for every l and m such that (gl, pi1) is a
high-demand good in pi1, and (gm, pij) is a low-demand good in pij .
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Figure 5 Utility graph where the agents are the nodes on the left and the goods are on the right.
The agents have been partitioned into two disjoint blocks - block1 (yellow block) and block2 (pink
block). In each block, agent bi owns good gi. The blue lines from bi to gj , indicates utility of U ,
and the orange ones a utility of 1.
7. For all i ∈ [|pi|−1], we set u((bl, pii+1), (gm, pii)) = 2 for every l and m such that (gl, pii+1)
is a high-demand good in pii, and (gm, pii) is a high demand-good in pii.
8. Finally we define the last block blockn,n comprising agents (b1, blockn,n) to (bn, blockn,n)
and goods (g1, blockn,n) to (gn, blockn,n) and we define a few more entries in the utility
matrix as follows,
u((bi, blockn,n), (gi, blockn,n)) = U ∀i ∈ [n].
u((bi, blockn,n), (g1, pi1)) = 1 ∀i ∈ [n].
u((bl, pi1), (gi, blockn,n)) = 1 ∀i ∈ [n], for every l such that (gl, pi1) is a high demand
good in pi1.
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I Observation 27. The number of agents and goods in I ′n ∈ Ω(n).
Proof. The number of agents in blockn,n is n. J
It can be verified that the instance I ′n is irreducible. On the very first iteration of the algo-
rithm in [10] (when prices of all goods are set to unity), we observe that the equality network
is disconnected. All the agents in blockn,n have zero surplus as they invest completely in
the good they own. After computing the balanced flow, if we partition the agents based on
their surpluses, we have that all agents from blocki,j have surplus (i− j)/i. Note that the
ratio of the surpluses of the agents in any two disjoint blocks is strictly larger than 1 + 1/n 23
- To see this consider any two arbitrary blocks blocki,j and blocki′,j′ . If i 6= i′ then the ratio
of the surpluses is larger than 1 + 1/n 23 (follows from the fact that i < n 13 and Lemma 25).
If i = i′, assume without loss of generality that j′ > j, then the ratio of the surpluses is
(i− j)/(i− j′) = 1 + (j′ − j)/(i− j′) ≥ 1 + 1/i > 1 + 1/n 23 (Since i < 1/n 13 ). Thus,only the
agents of pi1 belong in S after the first iteration. The algorithm steadily increases the prices
of the high-demand goods in pi1, but the surplus vector remains unchanged (follows from
Observation 26). Thus only agents of pi1 belong in S for n3 · log(U) iterations, when the
equality network finally changes. After the change notice that the surplus of all the agents
in pi1 becomes zero and only agents of pi2belong in S.
Inductively one can make the same argument, during execution of the algorithm, when
only agents of pii belong in S and the surpluses of all the agents in the blocks pij with j < i
and in blockn,n are zero and prices of the high demand goods in each of the blocks pij with
j < i is U j . The price increase of the high-demand goods in pii continues for Ω(n3 · log((U)i))
many iterations, until the equality network changes or equivalently when the equality edges
from (bl, pii) to (gm, pii−1) arise, for every l and m such that (gl, pii) is a high-demand good
in pii and (gm, pii−1) is a high-demand good in pii−1. With the new equality edges appearing,
new augmenting paths also appear in the equality network that reduce the surplus of all
agents in pii to zero. However since there are no edges connecting the agents in blocks
pi1, pi2, ..., pii to the high-demand goods of blocks pii+1, ...pi|pi|, (and therefore no augmenting
path via the agents in the blocks pii+1, ...pi|pi| to reduce surpluses of the agents in blocks pij
with j > i) the surpluses of the agents of the latter blocks remain unchanged. Henceforth
only agents pii+1 constitute S.
I Theorem 28. The number of iterations executed by the algorithm in [10] on the instance
I ′n is Ω((n4+
1
3 log(U))/ log(n)4).
Proof. With the utility matrix defined as above, the execution of the algorithm in [10] incurs
Ω(
∑
i∈[Θ( n
2
3
log2(n) )]
n3 · log(U i)) = Ω
(
n4+
1
3 · log(U)
log4 n
)
iterations. J
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(a) During the first iteration of the algorithm in [10] on I ′n. We have S = block1.
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(b) The equality network changes for the first time. Orange edges appear. S = block2.
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(c) The equality network changes for the second time. The edge from (b1, block2) to (g1, block1)
appears.
Figure 6 Running the algorithm in [10] on the instance similar to that in Figure 5 . The numbers
on left represent surplus of the agents and that on the right the prices of the goods.
